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fS. F. No.19168. In Bank. Apr. 9, 1957.} 
CHARijES P. BRATNOBER, Respondent, v. GERALDINE 
R. BRArrNOBER, Appellant. 
[1] Divorce-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance.-
Since it would be incongruous to allow an appealable order to 
become final and yet concede the power of a court at a later 
date, on the same state of facts, to issue an order nullifying it, 
the trial court is without authority to make an order reducing 
the amount of alimony or support payments awarded in an 
interlocutory or final divorce decree in the absence of a show-
ing that there has been a change in conditions subsequent to 
the entry of such decree. 
[2]] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance.-On a 
proper showing the court in a divorce action possesses power 
to modify a support order because of changed circumstances 
( Civ. Code, § 139), the justification for such order depends on 
the facts and circumstances of each case, and the propriety of 
the modification rests largely in the trial court's discretion. 
[3] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Finality.-A support award in a 
divorce action does not have the finality of an ordinary con-
tract since it is subject to reexamination by the court at any 
time. ( Civ. Code, § 139.) 
[4a, 4b] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance.-
Where a divorced husband testified, on a hearing of his 
motion for modification of a support order, that his expecta-
tions as to future salary increases constituted the basis for 
his agreement to make the support payments originally 
ordered, where these appeared to have been reasonable expecta-
tions resting on reasonable prospects, and where the original 
support order was based, in part at least, on his consent, the 
circumstances which motivated that consent were material to 
such order, a failure to realize such expectations may consti-
tute a change of circumstances justifying modification of the 
order, and in the absence of a clear showing of the court's 
abuse of discretion in making such modification its order must 
be sustained. 
[5] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance.-The 
court entering a divorce decree retains jurisdiction to modify 
its orders if circumstances warrant the change, and the proper 
procedure for a party who is unable to comply with an order 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 213 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 5] Divorce, § 216; [3] Divorce, 
§ 198; [4] Divorce,§ 216(5). 
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for the payment of alimony or the support of his minor 
children is to seek a modification of the order, not to resist its 
enforcement, thereby subjecting himself to contempt pro-
ceedings . 
.APPE.AL from an order of the Superior Court of the City 
and County of San Francisco modifying a divorce judgment 
by reducing the amount to be paid monthly for support of 
wife and minor children. Orla St. Clair, Judge . .Affirmed. 
Livingston & Feldman, Isabella H. Grant and Lawrence 
Livingston for .Appellant. 
Mervyn Schneider and .Anthony E. 0 'Brien for Respondent. 
SPENCE, J.-Defendant wife appeals from an order modi-
fying interlocutory and final judgments of divorce insofar 
as that order reduces the amount of alimony and child sup-
port payments. She contends that the evidence presented 
to the trial court did not constitute a legal basis for such 
modification, but the record does not sustain her position. 
The parties married in December, 1940, and separated in 
1949. Two children were the issue of the marriage. .At the 
time of separation the parties divided their community prop-
erty, the wife's share netting her some $11,400. The wife 
then moved, with the children, to Illinois to live with her 
parents. The husband in 1951 went through bankruptcy. In 
1952 he sued for divorce, and the wife cross-complained. 
During the trial of the case, the parties and counsel con-
ferred with the trial judge in chambers as to the terms of 
a possible settlement. It was then orally agreed that the 
husband would make monthly support payments of $250-
$100 per month for the support of each of the two children 
and $50 per month for the support of the wife-and that 
such provisions could be incorporated in any divorce decree. 
The trial then proceeded and an interlocutory decree of 
divorce was awarded to the wife on February 26, 1953. She 
was given custody of the two minor children, and the husband 
was ordered to make the above specified support payments. 
On March 2, 1954, shortly before time for entry of the 
final decree of divorce, the husband moved to modify the 
interlocutory decree by reducing the support payments. By 
stipulation of the parties, the motion was thereafter made 
applicable to the final decree, which was entered on March 
26, 1954. .After a hearing, the court granted the husband's 
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motion to modify on the ''grounds of change in circumstances 
and [his] inability ... to pay order." In its written order 
of modification the court found, in substance, that there had 
been a change in circumstances surrounding the husband's 
financial condition since the entry of the interlocutory decree 
in that the original provisions for support were based upon 
the husband's oral agreement at the time of the divorce trial 
to p::>v the specified sums, and that agreement was made the 
basis for the decree's provisions ; that no evidence as to the 
husband's financial conditions, his earnings or earning ca-
pacity, nor of the needs of the wife and minor children was 
adduced at the divorce trial; that the husband made the 
agreement with the hope, expectation and understanding that 
his earnings and monthly income would be substantially in-
creased following the entry of the interlocutory decree, either 
in the position in which he was then employed or in another 
position which he was expecting soon to take; that neither 
of these expectations was realized, and as a result he had 
not been able to make the payments required; that he was 
obliged to borrow money in order to make the payments up 
to and including February 26, 1954; and that he had no 
property or income of any kind, other than his earnings, 
which he might use to comply with the court's original sup-
port order. Accordingly, the court reduced the support pay-
ments for each child to $75 per month and the alimony 
payment for the wife to $1.00 per month. 
The evidence indisputably shows that the husband's take-
home pay at the time he agreed to the original payments was 
$338.62 per month, and that it remained the same thereafter, 
less $2.00 because of increased social security deductions; and 
that he was obliged to borrow $3,200 from his mother in order 
to make the support payments up to February 26, 1954. 
Defendant wife contends that there was no showing of 
changed circumstances to justify the modification. [1] Since 
it "would be incongruous to allow an appealable order to 
become final and yet to concede the power of a court at a later 
date, upon the same state of facts, to issue an order nullifying 
it" (Snyder v. Snyder, 219 Cal. 80, 81 [25 P.2d 403]), it is gen-
erally held that the "trial court is without authority to make 
an order reducing the amount of alimony [or support pay-
ments] awarded in an interlocutory [or final] decree of di-
vorce in the absence of a showing that there has been a change 
in conditions subsequent to the entry of [such] decree." 
(Ralphs v. Ralphs, 86 Cal.App.2d 324, 325 [194 P.2d 592] .) 
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[2] However, upon a proper showing, "the court possesses 
power to modify [a support] order because of changed circum-
stances ( Civ. Code, § 139) "; the justification for such "order 
depends on the facts and circumstances of each case'' ; and 
the ''propriety of [the] modification rests largely in the dis-
cretion of the trial court." (Moore v. Moore, 133 Cal.App.2d 
56, 58-59 [283 P.2d 338] ; Triest v. Triest, 67 Cal.App.2d 320, 
322 [154P.2d2].) 
At the modification hearing, plaintiff husband testified 
that at the time of the divorce trial he had been working for 
a record firm about a year and a half; that he anticipated an 
increase in salary as of that time, and a further raise later; 
that he had also been negotiating with another company for 
a better position, with "substantially more" money; that 
neither of these expectations materialized and, in fact, his net 
monthly salary was $2.00 less because of additional social 
security deductions. Defendant wife argues that these expec-
tations of plaintiff husband have no pertinency because it 
does not appear that they were communicated to her or the 
court at the divorce trial. She calls attention to the affidavit 
of the attorney who then represented her, stating that the 
original support payment "was not conditioned upon any 
increase in earnings.'' She relies on the rule pertaining to 
contracts that the undisclosed intentions of a party to a con-
tract do not furnish a basis for its modification. (Brant v. 
California Dairies, Inc., 4 Cal.2d 128, 133 [ 48 P.2d 13] ; Bell v. 
Minor, 88 Cal.App.2d 879, 882 [199 P.2d 718] .) [3] How-
ever, a support award does not have the finality of the ordinary 
contract as it is subject to re-examination by the court at any 
time. ( Civ. Code, § 139; W oolams v. W oolarns, 115 Cal.App. 
2d 1, 7 [251 P.2d 392]; Dunning v. Dunning, 114 Cal.App.2d 
110, 114 [249 P.2d 609].) Plaintiff husband maintains that 
the disclosure was made at the divorce trial as appears from 
his own testimony at the modification hearing, but that if 
there is any uncertainty or ambiguity in the record on that 
point, such disclosure could reasonably have been inferred 
by the court at the modification hearing as a circumstance jus-
tifying the reduction in the support payments. (Kossine v. 
Styliano, 40 Cal.App.2d 721, 724 [105 P.2d 952] .) But the 
parties' conflicting views on this question of disclosure need 
not be resolved here, for the propriety of the modification order 
does not necessarily depend upon such disclosure. 
[4a] In line with his motion for modification, plaintiff 
husband testified that his expectations as to future salary 
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increases constituted the basis for his agreement to make the 
support payments originally provided. These appear to have 
been reasonable expectations resting on reasonable prospects 
and since the original support order was based, in part at 
least, on his consent, the circumstances which motivated that 
consent were material to that order. An analogous situation 
is the case where the court may make an alimony award based 
not on the husband's actual earnings but on his ability to 
earn money, his future prospects. (Webber v. W ebbe1·, 33 Cal. 
2d 153, 160 [199 P.2d 934] ; ~McGann v. JJicGann, 82 Cal.App. 
2d 382, 388, 389 [186 P.2d 424] ; see also Pencovic v. Pencovic, 
45 Cal.2d 97, 102 [287 P.2d 501] .) Defendant relies on 
certain Alabama cases holding that any anticipated increase 
in income on the part of the husband at the time of the 
divorce decree, which may not have materialized, cannot be 
considered as a ground for reducing alimony payments. 
(Aiken v. Aiken, 221 Ala. 67 [127 So. 819, 820] ; Colton v. 
Colton, 252 Ala. 442 [ 41 So.2d 398, 399].) But in the light 
of the rule in this state that "a court is entitled to make 
[support allowances] in view of a person's earning ability" 
(Woolams v. Woolams, supra, 115 Cal.App.2d 1, 7) and his 
reasonable expectations are an essential consideration (Penco-
vic v. Pencovic, supra, 45 Cal.2d 97, 102), the contrary reason-
ing of the Alabama cases is not persuasive. 
Whether the support order rests upon agreement of the 
parties (see Adams v. Adams, 29 Cal.2d 621, 624-625 [177 
P.2d 265] ; Hough v. Hough, 26 Cal.2d 605, 612 [160 P.2d 
15]) or is determined by the court upon evidence (Becker v. 
Becker, 64 Cal.App.2d 239, 242 [148 P.2d 381]), the question 
of reasonable expectations is material and a failure to realize 
them may constitute a change of circumstances justifying 
modification of the order. As further indication of the need 
for modification of his support obligations, plaintiff cites the 
sizable sum he borrowed from his mother to meet the payments 
originally scheduled. (Sh7tlman v. Shulman, 125 Cal.App. 
2d 120, 121-122 [269 P.2d 923].) [5] Certainly, it cannot 
be disputed that "the trial court entering the decree still 
retains jurisdiction to modify its orders if circumstances war-
rant the change, and the proper procedure for a party who 
is unable to comply with an order for the payment of alimony 
or the support of his minor children is to seek a modification 
of the order-not to resist its enforcement, thereby subjecting 
himself to contempt proceedings." (Bailey v. Superior 
Court, 215 Cal. 548, 555 [11 P.2d 865]; Woolams v. Woolams, 
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supra, 115 Cal.App.2d 1, 7.) [4b] Here upon the record 
disclosing the failure of plaintiff's reasonable expectations as 
a change of circumstances, there appears to be nothing in-
equitable in the amount of the reduced payments-$75 per 
month for each child and $1 per month alimony for defendant 
wife-and in the absence of a clear showing of the court's 
abuse of its discretion in making such modification, its order 
must be sustained. (Leupe v. Lettpe, 21 Cal.2d 145, 151 [130 
P.2d 697]; Reed v. Reed, 128 Cal.App.2d 786, 793-794 [276 
P.2d 36] .) 
The order appealed from is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
McComb, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The holding in the majority opnnon is in direct conflict 
with the law of this state in two respects: First, it establishes 
a new rule of law in modification proceedings. Second, a trial 
court may now modify the support and maintenance provi-
sions of interlocutory and final decrees of divorce without any 
showing whatsoever of changed circumstances on the part of 
the payor, and the undisclosed expectations of a party to a 
contract may be considered in absolving that party from an 
improvident contract. Both of these holdings will cause untold 
confusion in fields of law where confusion had not heretofore 
existed and where it should not exist. In the ensuing opinion 
I will set forth all of the testimony to be found in the record 
tending to show that there had been such a change of circum-
stances as the law contemplates should exist before support 
and maintenance provisions in a decree of divorce may be 
modified. I will also set forth all of the evidence in the 
record relative to the oral contract upon which the support 
provisions in the decree was based. It is entirely clear from 
the record that the majority opinion is based on something 
other than the law and the record in the case at bar. 
In January, 1952, plaintiff husband, Charles, sued for di-
vorce alleging desertion and extreme cruelty ; Geraldine 
answered and cross-complained for separate maintenance al-
leging extreme cruelty. During the trial of the case a dis-
cussion of a financial settlement was had in the judge's 
chambers as a result of which Geraldine reluctantly agreed 
to seek a divorce rather than separate maintenance. After 
the conference the parties orally agreed that Charles would 
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pay $50 per month for the support of Geraldine and $100 a 
month for the support of each of the two children. It was 
agreed that if a divorce were obtained the provisions of the 
oral agreement, which was orally approved by the court, 
would be incorporated in the decree. 
'l'he interlocutory decree awarded a divorce to Geraldine 
on the ground of Charles' extreme cruelty, and Geraldine was 
given sole custody of the two minor children. The decree 
ordered Charles to pay to Geraldine the sum of $200 per 
month for the maintenance and support of the minor children 
and the sum of $50 per month for her support and mainte-
nance.* 
On March 2, 1954, just prior to the entry of the final decree 
of divorce, Charles filed a motion for an order modifying 
the interlocutory decree to delete the provisions for support 
of the children and Geraldine and to substitute therefor a 
provision for $50 per month support for each of the children. 
It was stipulated by the parties, and ordered by the court, 
that Charles' motion to amend the provisions of the interlocu-
tory decree would encompass the provisions of the final decree 
as well. 
After a hearing, the court granted Charles' motion to mod-
ify on ''grounds of change in circumstances and inability of 
[Charles] to pay order. [Charles] to pay $150 per month 
and $1.00 to wife for alimony until further order of Court. 
" 
In his affidavit in support of his motion for modification 
Charles averred that the support provisions were "based upon 
an oral agreement between said parties at the time of the 
trial of said action, and that said oral agreement was ap-
proved by the court and made the basis for said judgment; that 
affiant entered into said agreement upon the hope and expecta-
tion that his earnings and monthly income would be substan-
tially increased, either in the position in which he was and 
is now employed or in another position which he was expect-
ing to take shortly after the entry of said judgment; that 
neither of these expectations were realized; that as a result 
affiant has never been able to make payment under said 
judgment; that his total take-home pay and income from all 
sources is $338.62 per month; that his personal and business 
expenses exceed $322 per month; that affiant has no property, 
*There was no reference to any agreement between the parties; there 
was no reference to any termination date for the payment of child 
support and/or support and maintenance for Geraldine. 
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goods or income of any kind which he may use to comply 
with said judgment, nor no prospects of any increase in his 
earnings in the immediate future .... " (Emphasis added.) 
It is Charles' position that the original award of $250 was 
agreed to by him because of his disclosed expectation that he 
would receive a raise in salary or be employed by another 
firm where he would receive a larger salary; that the failure 
of either expectation to materialize constituted such a change 
in circumstances as to warrant a modification of the support 
provisions. Geraldine's position is that there has been no 
change in Charles' financial circumstances in the period be-
tween the time of the original award and the motion for 
modification; that Charles' expectations had no bearing on 
the original agreement and were not disclosed at that time. 
It is not disputed that Charles' income (with the exception 
of an additional deduction of $2.00 for increased social 
security payments) remained absolutely the same. During 
the period subsequent to the interlocutory decree and just 
prior to the time of his motion for modification Charles paid 
no part of the support and maintenance ordered by the inter-
locutory decree. Just prior to his motion for modification he 
borrowed the sum of $3,200 from his mother and fulfilled his 
obligation for that period of time. 
Assuming for the moment that Charles' expectations of a 
higher salary or more lucrative position could form a legiti-
mate basis for a support and maintenance award, the first 
question to be discussed is whether or not Charles' expectations 
were disclosed at the time of the original award. AU the evi-
dence in the record as it relates to this point will be set forth 
herein. 
The affidavit of Edward L. Barry, the attorney for Geraldine 
at the time of the original award, contains this statement: 
''In aid of a settlement, there was a conversation between 
the attorneys and in the presence of Judge Wollenberg on 
the subject of custody of the children and financial support. 
Affiant [Barry] took the position that a total of somewhere 
between $400 and $500 per month should be paid for the 
support of defendant and the children but affiant does not 
remember the exact figure which he proposed. Counsel for 
.plaintiff suggested a much lower figure, something less than 
$250 per month, saying that plaintiff could not pay the 
amount demanded by affiant. 
''Thereupon there was a discussion as to what amount 
plaintiff could and would pay, and the attorneys agreed that 
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the sum of $250 per month was a proper amount to be paid 
as support money for defendant and the children and that 
this amount would be divided at $100 per month for each 
child and $50 per month for defendant. It was also agreed 
that current dental bills of the children and a bill of Best & 
Co. would be paid by defendant. The parties then and there 
agreed that defendant as cross-complainant would take a 
decree of divorce provided that she had evidence to support 
such decree, and that she would have the custody of the 
children and that plaintiff, as cross-defendant, would be re-
quired to pay the sum of $100 per month for the maintenance 
and support of each of the minor children and the sum of $50 
per month for the maintenance and support of defendant and 
cross-complainant. It was also agreed that plaintiff would 
be required to pay the bill of Best & Co. in the sum of $189.45 
and the current dental bills of the minor children of plaintiff. 
I do not know whether or not either the Best & Co. bill or 
the dental bills have been paid. 
"The oral agreement made in the chambers of Judge Wol-
lenberg, as set forth above, was approved by him verbally 
and it was agreed that if a divorce was obtained, all of the 
provisions of said oral agreement would be incorporated in 
the decree. Thereupon the case proceeded to trial and the 
court ordered judgment for divorce in favor of defendant and 
cross-complainant and also the other matters above mentioned 
and on February 26, 1953, the interlocutory decree of divorce 
was submitted to counsel for plaintiff and cross-defendant 
and approved by them and signed by Judge Wollenberg. Said 
interlocutory decree includes the matters above set forth plus 
an allowance for attorneys' fees and costs, which allowance 
has been paid. 
"The sum of $250 per month was not conditioned upon any 
increase in earnings. Nothing was said about the provisions 
of the decree being based upon anything which was to take 
place in the future. Nothing was discussed or considered 
which involved any question as to future payments. . . . '' 
Mr. Barry's affidavit was not controverted. Charles' affi-
davit, heretofore quoted, does not aver that he disclosed his 
expectations. 
The following testimony was adduced at the hearing on the 
motion for modification: 
After testifying that he worked as a salesman at the time 
of the original award and that his salary was $338.62 a 
month, he was asked: 
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"Q. [By counsel for Charles] : Now, at that time, at the 
time the entering of this decree of divorce, did you have 
pending any negotiations for any other employment at that 
time?" Counsel for defendant objected on the ground that 
the question was ''irrelevant, incompetent, and immaterial, as 
to what he was negotiating for. 
"THE CouRT: It might tend to show what his condition 
was, financially, at least. It might show hope, anyway. 
"THE WITNESS: I was at that time contemplating taking a 
position with another record firm, and had been interviewed 
for it, and, all things being equal, expected to take it; however, 
I would have had to start at a somewhat lower salary. How-
ever, in my years in the business I have watched this particu-
lar firm move their men up, and I expected that, had I taken 
the job, the same would have happened to me. 
''MR. 0 'BRIEN: Q. And what would you have been making 
with that firm, if you know at this time?'' Counsel for de-
fendant objected. The court then questioned the witness and 
ascertained that he was still working for the same firm; that 
he was making $2.00 per month less because of increased social 
security deductions; that if he had taken the other position 
he would now be making "substantially" more. His attorney 
then proceeded to question him: 
"Q. At the time when this divorce was taken, on February 
26, 1953, did you anticipate an increase in salary? A. Yes.'' 
Counsel for defendant objected to the question and answer 
as "speculative. His expectations are of no consequence. The 
question is whether there is any difference now from what 
there was then.'' The court stated that he wanted to know 
"this man's frame of mind, what bearing that has on his 
financial condition--
" MR. 0 'BRIEN: Q. May I ask you this: Wasn't 1:t a fact that 
the possibility of your raise-of a raise in you1· position-
wasn't that discussed between us, inclnding counsel for your 
w1:fe?" After this question follow three pages of objections 
and colloquy between court and counsel. Then the following 
occurred: 
''MR. 0 'BRIEN: Q. Did ymt answer my last question, whether 
or not the expectancy of a raise on yo11r salary was discussed 
by you and the attorneys for your w1:je? 
"MR. LIVINGSTON [counsel for defendant]: That involves 
another question. 
"THE CouRT: You may reserve your same objection. 
"MR. LIVINGSTON: I don't see how anything that is merged 
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into an agreement which, in turn, is merged into a judgment 
of the Court is admissible in evidence. That is an entirely 
different principal. [Sic.] 
''THE CouRT: I want to know this man's frame of mind, 
so that will be considered part of the same principal (sic]. 
"THE WITNESS : Yes. 
"MR. 0 'BRIEN: Q. And in those discussions you stated that 
you expected a raise within 18 months of your employment T 
"MR. LIVINGSTON: Same objection. 
''THE CouRT: I don't think the agreement itself is perti-
nent. Did you expect a raise, regardless of what you said 
to anybody? 
"THE WITNEss: Yes. 
''THE CouRT: And was that expectation used by you as 
a basis for the payments-the proposal as to what you would 
pay~ 
"THE WITNESS: Yes." (Emphasis added.) 
I find no other evidence in the record concerning the dis-
closure, or nondisclosure, of Charles' expectations at the 
time of the original award. I find no answer by Charles to 
his attorney's question other than the equivocal "yes" which 
seems to be an erroneous answer to the question as to whether 
or not he had answered the question concerning disclosure. It 
appears, however, from the questions asked that the trial judge 
was of the opinion that the disclosure or non-disclosure of 
Charles' expectations at the time of the original agreement 
was immaterial. It will be recalled that he asked Charles if 
he expected a raise "regardless of what you said to any-
body?" 
If it were not for the uncontroverted affidavit of Mr. Barry, 
counsel for defendant at the trial of the divorce action, 
which the parties stipulated might be considered on appeal, we 
could assume, in line with the rule set forth in Russ v. Russ, 
68 Cal.App.2d 400, 405 [156 P.2d 767], Leupe v. Leupe, 21 
Cal.2d 145, 151-152 [130 P.2d 697], and Valentine v. Valen-
tine, 47 Cal.App.2d 438, 440 [118 P.2d 17], that as the 
record of the former hearing is not before us, we cannot say 
that the proof was the same as that adduced at the original 
hearing and that we must assume that other and different facts 
were established at the second hearing. It has been here 
stipulated (Cl.T. 26) that no testimony was taken at the 
trial of the divorce action concerning the amount or source of 
Charles' income. This does not appear to be a case in which 
there is a conflict in the evidence so that we must resolve 
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those conflicts in support of the order appealed from (Werner 
v. Werner, 120 Cal.App.2d 248, 251-252 [260 P.2d 961] ; 
McKee v. McKee, 108 Cal.App.2d 488, 490 [239 P.2d 37]). 
Since the record shows that Charles did not disclose his 
expectations of either a better position or an increase in salary 
at the time of the original award, and that the trial judge 
considered disclosure of those expectations immaterial, should 
the failure of those expectations to materialize constitute such 
a change of circumstances as to warrant a modification of the 
support award~ Or did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
its order of modification¥ 
No California case bearing upon this point has been called 
to our attention and independent research has revealed none. 
There is an Alabama case where the question was considered 
although it does not appear from the opinion whether or not 
the husband's anticipated increase in income was revealed at 
the time of the original award. In Colton v. Colton, 252 Ala. 
442 [41 So.2d 398, 399], where the alimony awarded was 
based on agreement of the parties, it was held: ''The wife 
was granted the divorce. We must proceed on the assumption 
that the decree rendered was equitable and fair. Any antici-
pated increase in income on the part of the husband at that 
time, which may not have materialized, cannot be considered 
as a ground for reducing the alimony payments to the former 
wife." (Emphasis added.) (See also Aiken v. Aiken, 221 
Ala. 67 [ 127 So. 819].) The rule in California is well estab-
lished that there must be a showing of changed circumstances 
before an award of alimony may be modified (Simpson v. 
Simpson, 134 Cal.App.2d 219, 224 [285 P.2d 313] ; Ralphs v. 
Ralphs, 86 Cal.App.2d 324, 325 [194 P.2d 592]; Moore v. 
Moore, 133 Cal.App.2d 56, 58 [283 P.2d 338] .) A brief sum-
mary of the facts presented here shows that Charles' income 
has remained the same as it was at the time of the inter-
locutory decree (with the exception of the increased $2.00 
social security deduction heretofore mentioned) ; he is em-
ployed in the same position with the same company. Geraldine 
is living with her family in Illinois in a home she helped her 
father to purchase with the proceeds of sales of property 
received by her earlier from Charles; the minor children live 
with her; she is of necessity unemployed due to an agreement 
with her parents that she remain at home and care for the 
children; her parents and Charles' mother have assisted her 
financially. The Colton case appears to be in line with Cali-
fornia cases holding that the undisclosed intentions of a party 
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to a contract do not furnish a basis for its modification (Brant 
v. California Dairies, Inc., 4 Cal.2d 128, 133 [ 48 P.2d 13] ; 
Bell v. Minor, 88 Cal.App.2d 879, 882 [199 P.2d 718]). In 
the Brant case this court said: ''But it is now a settled 
principle of the law of contract that the undisclosed intentions 
of the parties are, in the absence of mistake, fraud, etc., im-
material; and that the outward manifestation or expression 
of assent is controlling. This is the 'objective' standard, 
established by the modern decisions and approved by authori-
tative writers. (See Zurich Gen. Ace. etc. Co. v. Industrial 
Ace. Com., 132 Cal.App. 101 [22 P.2d 572]; McConnell v. 
Lamontagne, 82 N.H. 423 [134 A. 718] ; 1 Williston, Con-
tracts, § 21, p. 21; 4 Wigmore, Evidence, 2d ed., p. 191; Rest., 
Contracts, § 71.) " It was also held in Leo F. Piazza Paving 
Co. v. Bebek & B1·lcich, 141 Cal.App.2d 226, 230 [296 P.2d 
368], that "Both sides also agree that in determining whether 
there has been a mutual consent to contract the courts not 
interested in the subjective intent of the parties, but only 
in their objective intent-that is, what would a reasonable 
man believe from the outward manifestations of consent. 
(Brant v. California Dairies, Inc., 4 Cal.2d 128 [48 P.2d 
13] ; Canavan v. College of Osteopathic Phys. & S., 73 Cal. 
App.2d 511 [166 P.2d 878].)" (Emphasis added.) Inas-
much as here there is no showing in the record that Charles 
ever disclosed his expectations of increased income at the 
time the agreement was made, and that the trial judge con-
sidered disclosure immaterial, it appears that there is no 
merit to his argument that the frustration of those expecta-
tions constituted a sufficient change of circumstances to war-
rant a modification of the alimony and support award. 
The majority opinion states that "At the modification hear-
ing, plaintiff husband testified that at the time of the divorce 
trial he had been working for a record firm about a year and 
a half; that he anticipated an increase in salary as of that time, 
and a /ttrther raise later)· that he had also been negotiating 
with another company for a better position, with 'substantially 
more' money; that neither of these expectations materialized 
and .... " What Charles actually testified to has been here-
tofore set forth. He also said that he had been "contem-
plating'' taking a job with another company where he would 
have had to start "at a somewhat lower salary" although he 
had seen that company "move their men up"; and that he 
thought if he had gone with the company he would have been 
making "substantially more" money; he also testified that he 
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had, at the time of the divorce, been working for a year 
and a half with no raise in salary. There was absolutely no 
evidence that his hope of receiving a raise, or a better position 
had ever been communicated to anyone, either prior to, or at 
the conference between the parties and their counsel in 
chambers. 
The majority concludes that plaintiff husband's undisclosed 
"great expectations" constituted the basis for his agreement 
to make the support payments originally provided. ''These 
appear to have been reasonable expectations resting on reason-
able prospects and since the original support order was based, 
in part at least, on his consent, the circumstances which moti-
vated that consent were material to that order." The major-
ity opinion then cites Webber v. Webber, 33 Cal.2d 153, 160 
[199 P.2d 934], McGann v. McGann, 82 Cal.App.2d 382 [186 
P.2d 424], and Pencovic v. Pencovic, 45 Cal.2d 97 [287 P.2d 
501], for the proposition that the court may make an alimony 
award based not on the husband's actual earnings but on his 
ability to earn money, "his future prospects." 
The cases cited in the majority opinion are not authority 
for the situation prevailing in the case at bar. In Webber v. 
Webber, supra, we reversed the trial court which had, we 
found, prejudged the case and had himself ''waived'' any 
support for the wife. The husband had testified that he had 
made from $40 to $47 per week "take-home-pay"; that he 
had not sought other employment ''although he could have 
gone to work for $140 a month" but had not done so because 
of the trial coming up, but stated he could get another job. 
We held, after discussing defendant husband's testimony con-
cerning his ability to earn money and get another job, that not 
only his actual earnings but his ability to earn money affected 
the propriety of an alimony award. In the case at bar, 
Charles agreed to the monthly payments knowing that he was 
then earning a certain sum per month. If his expectations 
of a better position or more money entered into his calcula-
tions, they were not disclosed to anyone. The affidavit of 
Geraldine's attorney shows that at the time Charles agreed 
to the payments, there was a discussion as to "what amount 
plain tiff could and would pay" ; that "the sum of $250 per 
month was not conditioned upon any increase in earnings. 
Nothing was said about the provisions of the decree being 
based upon anything which was to take place in the future. 
Nothing was discussed or considered which involved any 
question as to future payments.'' 
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In McGann v. McGann, sttpra, the defendant was engaged 
in the practice of dentistry. The evidence adduced showed 
that defendant's income during the five months of his prac-
tice (after returning from the service) had increased sub-
stantially each month. The court reluctantly affirmed a very 
low support award but noted that the plaintiff wife had the 
right to apply again for a change in the allowance. It was 
concluded that "the court's error in failing to consider the 
matter of the defendant's earning ability is without prejudice, 
for to grant an award on future earning ability based on 
such a short actual experience of practice might be too specu-
lative, especially as the amount awarded has no aspects of 
finality. If his earnings have continued at the same rate, 
or increased, the court, upon application, necessarily will be 
required to award a substantially larger sum.'' In the case 
at bar Charles' earnings were known at the time he agreed 
to make the payments. Any undisclosed expectation of a 
better position or more salary at his present job (especially 
in view of the fact that he had been working for a year and 
a half without an increase) would surely be much too specu-
lative to consider even had such expectations been disclosed 
which they were not. 
In Pencovic v. Pencovic, supra, we specifically held that 
there was ''ample evidence of changed circumstances and of 
defendant's financial ability to meet his children's needs and 
of his ability to earn money in the future." It will be recalled 
that the defendant was the founder of the "Wisdom, Knowl-
edge, Faith, and Love Fountain"; that he as "Master" of 
this religion received large donations of money from the 
members and that we held that these donations were, as 
found by the trial court, in reality compensation for his 
services. We also noted that he was an "able-bodied man" 
and that the trial court could reasonably conclude that he 
had the earning capacity to support his ill wife and children. 
The record there showed that defendant had earned a good 
salary; that he had received, from the "Fountain" funds 
with which to support his family, etc. 
The "earning ability" of the payor in the cases just dis-
cussed was based on past performance and evidence of what 
had been earned and what could be earned. The conclusion 
reached by the court in each of the above cases was not based 
on the premise that the payor had an undisclosed expectation 
of making more money at the tin1,e he agreed to the support 
payments. 
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As an alternative ground for urging the affirmance of the 
modification orders, Charles contends that the fact that he 
was forced to borrow money to pay the accumulated support 
payments is a sufficient showing of changed circumstances. 
Charles relies on Becker v. Becker, 64 Cal.App.2d 239 [148 
P.2d 381], and Shulman v. Shulman, 125 Cal.App.2d 120 
[269 P.2d 923], for the proposition that the incurrence of 
financial obligations to third parties is a proper subject for 
consideration on a motion to modify an alimony award. 
In the Becker case, supra, the court noted that the record 
of the first hearing was not before the court and that, there-
fore, the rule set forth in Leupe v. Leupe, 21 Cal.2d 145, 151 
[130 P.2d 697], was controlling. It was also stated that the 
wife owned her own home, "had the ability to do some work," 
and was able to meet her own needs at least in part; that the 
husband had remarried, earned $50 per week and was indebted 
in the sum of $150 which he had borrowed to pay on account 
of alimony. The court indulged in the presumption, in the 
absence of a record of the testimony taken at the time of the 
original award, that other and different facts were established 
at the time the alimony award was modified. As I have here-
tofore pointed out, the record here shows, without conflict, 
that Charles' circumstances have remained precisely the same 
as they were at the time of the original award. His indebted-
ness to his mother in order to pay arrearages in the support 
and maintenance ordered is the obvious result logically follow-
ing from the fact that he had made no effort to pay any part 
of the alimony and support provisions of the interlocutory 
decree. Standing alone, it is my opinion that this indebted-
ness cannot be considered a sufficient change in circumstances 
to warrant a reduction in the support provisions of the inter-
locutory and final decrees of divorce. In Shulman v. Shul-
man, supra, the court held that the ''record affirmatively 
shows evidence of change in condition since the prior hearing. 
There is testimony that respondent's income for the year 
1951 was $3,156.43, and that during that year respondent 
paid appellant $2,880, and that in 1951 defendant sold a 
diamond ring in order to realize $1,500. It also appears that 
appellant in October, 1951, transferred her home to her sister 
without consideration, although this house was worth $11,000 
less an encumbrance of $2,500. '' The court also pointed out 
that the husband had paid to his former wife more than his 
taxable profit from his business; that he had borrowed $2,000 
from a bank and $1,000 from a private individual; that he had 
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mortgaged his truck and car to secure payment; that he had 
been in a wheel chair for the entire period and so required 
more money for his personal living expenses because he was 
so afflicted. It is quite obvious that the situation in the 
Shulman case is not at all similar to the one under consid-
eration. 
In the case at bar, Charles had never supported his wife 
and children since the divorce; she was living with her parents 
under an agreement which provided that she had to live at 
horne and care for the children rather than seeking employ-
ment; her parents and Charles' mother had supported her and 
the children. 
While it is quite true that a modification of an award of 
alimony pursuant to section 139 of the Civil Code rests within 
the discretion of the trial court and that its order may not be 
set aside without a clear showing of an abuse of discretion, 
it appears to me that the modification here involved was, in 
the absence of any showing in the record of a change of 
circumstances, an abuse of discretion. (Ralphs v. Ralphs, 86 
Cal..App.2d 324 [194 P.2d 592]; Molema v. Molema, 103 Cal. 
App. 79 [283 P. 956] ; Snyder v. Snyder, 219 Cal. 80, 81 [25 
P.2d 403].) 
I would reverse the order appealed from. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 8, 
1957. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should 
be granted. 
